Fred neulander trial case number

I'm already a fan, don't show this again. Send MSN Feedback. How can we improve? Please give an overall site rating:. Privacy Statement. Rose, N. The right of a party to cross-examine a witness to show bias or interest "does not mean, however, that the cross-examiner has a license to roam at will under the guise of impeaching the witness.

Pontery, 19 N. The actual receipt of favorable treatment "is not a sine qua non to appropriate cross-examination" for establishing bias of that witness toward the State. Vaccaro, N.

Parsons, N. Holmes, N. Where a witness has "a motive to curry favor with the State," the defense must be afforded "the opportunity to probe the witness's self-interested belief in that respect. The judge here focused the inquiry on Jenoff's state of mind and his self-interest. She permitted cross-examination of whether he thought that the police were looking at him as a suspect in the Bell homicide and whether he wanted to curry favor with them by cooperating more in defendant's case, but she did not permit inquiry as to whether Jenoff had actually killed Janice Bell or was involved in her murder.

The inquiry into bias was dependent on whether Jenoff knew or believed that he was a suspect in the Bell homicide or that the police were actually looking at him in their investigation, not whether he was actually guilty of the crime. Under N. Morton, N. However, an appellate court will reverse if it concludes that the excluded evidence "is critical to the defense, as where there was no other available evidence to demonstrate particular defense issues.

Scherzer, N. Defendant's purpose in seeking to have the details of the unrelated homicide admitted was to further impugn Jenoff's credibility. In that regard, Jenoff's persistent traits of dishonesty, exaggeration, and self-aggrandizement were candidly admitted in the State's case and subjected to extensive cross-examination by defendant. Defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Jenoff thoroughly on interest and bias and to explore the relevant issue of whether the Bell investigation caused him to "add-on" facts to his trial testimony to curry favor with the State.

See State v. Engel, N. In addition to Jenoff's purported status as a suspect in the unrelated homicide, the jury already knew that he was charged with the murder and conspiracy to commit the murder of Carol Neulander, that he had pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter, that he was exposed to a statutory maximum of thirty years in prison, and that he was not going to be sentenced until after defendant's trial.

The details provided by Beardsley, the photographs of the tire marks, and the information regarding Jenoff's contacts with Bell's family would have, in our view, had a significant potential to confuse the jury by focusing on Jenoff's guilt in the murder of Janice Bell, rather than on the true nature of the inquiry, the reason for his cooperation with the State. We are likewise convinced that the judge appropriately concluded that the details about the Bell investigation sought to be admitted by defendant would have led to undue delay in what was already a complicated trial.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the judge correctly determined that a time-consuming mini-trial of the Bell homicide would have occurred had defendant been permitted to offer the excluded evidence.

We are not persuaded by defendant's assertion on appeal that the prosecutor's failure to explain "what his rebuttal of the defense evidence would entail," together with the limited nature of the evidence defendant sought to present, made it difficult to envision a serious prospect for disruption of the trial. There was significant additional evidence that the jury would have had to consider if the challenged evidence had been permitted, namely: 1 Beardsley's five prior interviews with a defense investigator without mentioning the tire tracks; 2 the information that only the defense, and not the police, had investigated Jenoff's alibi for the unrelated homicide; 3 Jenoff's execution of a consent-to-search form allowing the authorities to search his home office for materials concerning the unrelated homicide, and what, if any, information was found during that search; and, of course, 4 Jenoff's denial of any involvement in the unrelated homicide.

We are satisfied that the judge correctly found that the probative value of the evidence sought to be admitted was slight when faced with the prospect that its admission would have necessitated the Bell murder trial being conducted within defendant's trial, which would have resulted in not only undue delay, but confusion on the part of the jury by misdirecting it away from its mandate to determine defendant's guilt.

Under these circumstances, the limitations imposed by the judge on the trial testimony of Jenoff and Beardsley did not offend the constitutional safeguards. Defendant also argues that the evidence of tire tracks, Jenoff's contacts with the Bell family, and details of the Bell homicide should have been permitted as defense evidence of other crimes under N. Initially, we note that at oral argument on appeal defendant asserted that trial counsel raised the admission of Jenoff's statements to Beardsley concerning the Bell murder as other-crimes evidence under N.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the record reflects that defense counsel mentioned that there was a potential that he might seek admissibility of the evidence under N.

Thus, defendant never gave the judge the opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the evidence as other-crimes evidence or to perform the appropriate N. Under the plain error rule, we will only consider allegations of error not brought to the trial court's attention that have a clear capacity to produce an unjust result.

Macon, 57 N. We generally decline to consider issues that were not presented at trial. Alan J. Cornblatt, P. Barow, N. It is well settled that "[q]uestions not raised below 'will ordinarily not be considered on appeal. Cryan, N. Bobo, N. Lakomy, N. Because defendant never sought to admit the evidence concerning the Bell murder investigation under N. We, therefore, would ordinarily decline to consider it.

Nevertheless, we make the following observations. Garfole, 76 N. When other-crimes evidence is proffered by a defendant as exculpatory evidence, "simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility.

Although a defendant seeking to use other-crimes evidence is afforded a simpler relevancy test than imposed on the State, a "court must [still] analyze the proffered defensive other-crimes evidence pursuant to N.

Cook, N. Indeed, as we have previously noted, when reviewing a trial court's N. We have already determined that the judge's N. See, e. If the judge had considered N. Thus, the outcome would have been the same. We conclude, therefore, that there was no error, much less plain error. Placing heavy reliance on State v. Artwell, N. Defendant maintains that the same precautions used when Beardsley testified were not followed when Keeny was presented as a witness.

In Artwell, the defendant's witness, Herbert Boone, testified while restrained by handcuffs and in prison garb. Boone's testimony corroborated Artwell's account, which was significantly different from that given by the arresting officers.

The Court held:. Unlike the use of restraints, requiring a witness to testify in prison clothing "further[s] no vital State interest. Accordingly, going forward, a trial court may not require a defendant's witness to appear at trial in prison garb. In future cases, a defendant therefore need not make an affirmative request of the trial court that his or her witnesses appear in civilian clothing. Instead, as a general rule the corrections authorities should supply defense witnesses with civilian clothing and those witnesses should enter the courtroom in such attire.

We note, however, that when an incarcerated witness is expected to testify on a defendant's behalf that defendant should notify the trial court and the State as soon as. We note that Artwell was decided on July 2, , more than a year and a half after defendant's trial was completed. The Court's blanket proscription on the wearing of prison garb was to be applied "[i]n future cases. The Court in Artwell did not give its ruling retroactive effect. Accordingly, we do not agree with defendant that Keeny's appearance in prison attire deprived defendant of a fair trial.

Unlike the witness in Artwell, Keeny was neither associated with defendant nor was he called as a witness to corroborate defendant's account. Rather, he was presented as a fellow jailhouse inmate of Jenoff's and called to testify about a conversation that occurred in the Camden County jail while Keeny was awaiting transfer to state prison.

There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant notified the trial judge that Keeny needed clothing or objected to him testifying in prison garb. After greeting Keeny with "good morning," the first introductory questions asked by defense counsel were where Keeny currently resided, whether he was currently serving a state prison sentence, and why he was in prison.

After obtaining the answers from Keeny that he was presently serving a prison term in Bayside State Prison for burglary, defendant then established that Keeny had a long history of involvement with the criminal justice system.

Defendant covered Keeny's conviction for criminal mischief, drug conviction, aggravated robbery conviction in Texas, convictions for burglary and receiving stolen property, and burglary conviction for which he was currently serving time. Keeny related Jenoff's purported statements that the killing of Carol Neulander was a "botched burglary," that "the kid snapped," and that defendant had "no clue. Although Keeny's testimony was used, indirectly, to exculpate defendant, it was not offered as information gained from knowledge arising out of an association with defendant.

Unlike Keeny, Beardsley was not questioned about his present prison status or prior criminal record. Keeny's inmate status, by contrast, was made clear by defendant's direct examination. Under those circumstances, Keeny's wearing of prison clothing would have been expected by the jury. It did not have the capacity to undermine Keeny's credibility any further than the information obtained on direct examination concerning Keeny's status and criminal record, nor was there any chance that Keeny's appearance in prison attire suggested defendant's guilt by association.

We are satisfied that any error in allowing Keeny to appear in prison garb was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result. Defendant next challenges, for the first time on appeal, the judge's failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that the guilty pleas of Jenoff and Daniels could be used only to assess credibility and not as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt. Defendant relies for support on State v. Stefanelli, 78 N. Murphy, N. Defendant's reliance is misplaced.

We conclude that any error here was harmless. During direct examination, the State showed Jenoff a copy of his plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter of Carol Neulander.

Defendant did not ask the judge to give a limiting instruction regarding the use of the guilty plea. During the lengthy cross-examination of Jenoff regarding his plea agreement, defendant suggested that the better Jenoff performed at trial and the "bigger and more expansive the lie," the better Jenoff's ultimate benefit would be when it came to his sentencing.

In fact, Jenoff agreed that he was seeking a benefit from the prosecutor and the judge by his testimony. He explained that he wanted to impress them with his cooperation and truthful testimony. During his summation, the prosecutor did not argue that Jenoff's guilty plea was substantive evidence of defendant's guilt. The testimony of Daniels' attorney established that Daniels entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter and to first-degree robbery.

According to his counsel, Daniels pled guilty because he wanted to avoid the death penalty and because he wanted to come forward about his involvement. Again, defendant did not ask the judge to give a limiting instruction regarding the use of the guilty plea. In summation, the prosecutor refrained from using Daniels' guilty plea as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt. Toner, F. A trial court has an independent obligation "to give the jury a proper cautionary instruction as to the limited use of this testimony for credibility purposes, even in the absence of a specification of reasons by the prosecutor or a request therefor by defendants.

In Stefanelli, a co-defendant testified about his role in a conspiracy with the defendant to break and enter and to commit larceny. The prosecutor told the jury during summation "that it was an insult to their collective intelligence to believe that" the co-defendant would have pled guilty if he had not been in a conspiracy with the defendant.

The trial judge gave no limiting instruction regarding the use of the co-defendant's guilty plea and no curative instruction regarding the prosecutor's improper summation comment. The Court held that the co-defendant's guilty plea was not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt but was admissible for the limited purpose of affecting the co-defendant's credibility.

The Court declared that when a co-defendant's guilty plea is admitted into evidence, "a limiting instruction [should be given] to the jury restricting the use of a guilty plea to the issue of credibility. Nevertheless, the Court in Stefanelli held that the absence of the limiting instruction was harmless error because the co-defendant's guilt "was established independently," and because he had been "thoroughly cross-examined and his credibility severely tested.

The Court found that under those circumstances, the absence of a limiting instruction was "truly harmless" and added "nothing of substantive consequence. In Murphy, supra, N.

In Murphy, the co-defendants were the only witnesses to testify about a theft they committed with defendant. They also testified to their guilty pleas. When explaining a guilty plea, the judge enhanced the credibility of the co-defendants by telling the jury that the pleas could only have been accepted by a trial court if the judge was satisfied that the co-defendants were "in fact, guilty of the offense.

The trial judge gave a Stefanelli limiting instruction. Thereafter, in summation, the prosecutor also bolstered the co-defendants' credibility by using an analogy that prisoners who fool their captors get beaten while those that are truthful do not.

The Murphy panel concluded that, because the judge enhanced the co-defendants' credibility and the only evidence against defendant was presented by his co-defendants, a two-fold instruction adding the prohibition against using a guilty plea as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt was necessary. Here, like Stefanelli, but unlike Murphy, Jenoff's and Daniels' guilt was established by independent evidence. More importantly, the prosecutor did not improperly argue that Jenoff's and Daniels' guilty pleas could be used as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt and there were no instructions enhancing their credibility.

Further, similar to the circumstances in Stefanelli, Jenoff's and Daniels' motives to lie were relentlessly and thoroughly explored in cross-examination, which severely tested their credibility. Neither Jenoff's nor Daniels' plea added any extra evidential weight to proofs of defendant's involvement. See Stefanelli, supra, 78 N. Finally, although the judge did not give an instruction concerning the specific use that could be made of their guilty pleas, she charged:.

My next instruction concerns the evaluation of the testimony of Leonard Jenoff and Paul Daniels. Leonard Jenoff and Paul Daniels have admitted their guilt and have testified in this trial on behalf of the prosecution. The law requires that the testimony of such witnesses be given careful scrutiny. In weighing their testimony, therefore, you may consider whether either of them has a special interest in the outcome of the case, and whether such testimony was influenced by the hope or expectation of any favorable treatment or reward, or by any feelings of revenge or reprisal.

She also instructed that "if you find Mr. Jenoff to be credible and worthy of belief, you have a right to convict the defendant. The lack of a limiting instruction did not have a clear capacity to produce an unjust result nor did it affect the outcome of the trial.

See R. During the charge conference, defense counsel inquired, "I'm curious, is there any 'false in one, false in all' language in the [charge]. I don't think it should be given in this case. The judge gave what amounted to the standard charge on credibility, ending by telling the jury "as judges of the facts, you will weigh the testimony of each witness, and then determine the weight to give to it.

Through that process, you may accept all of it, a portion of it, or none of it. Defendant asserts that because several of the witnesses, including Jenoff, Soncini, Levin, and Levin's friends, provided contradictory statements to the police, the "false in one, false in all" charge should have been given. However, conspicuously absent from defendant's argument is the fact that there were also contradictory statements made by defendant to the police concerning his affair with Soncini.

We doubt, therefore, that defendant would have benefited from a "false in one, false in all" instruction. If you believe that any witness deliberately lied to you, on any fact significant to your decision in this case, you have the right to reject all of that witness's testimony.

However in your discretion you may believe some of the testimony and not believe other parts of the testimony. If you believe that any witness or party willfully or knowingly testified falsely to any facts significant to your decision in the case, with intent to deceive you, you may give such weight to his or her testimony as you may deem it is entitled.

You may believe some of it, or you may, in your discretion, disregard all of it. The "false in one, false in all" charge is optional and may be given "in any situation in which [the judge] reasonably believes a jury may find a basis for its application. Ernst, 32 N. The decision whether to give it or not is within the trial judge's discretion. The charge does "not apply unless the witness willfully testified falsely to some material fact.

D'Ippolito, 22 N. Indeed, the charge itself speaks in terms of false testimony under oath rather than contradictory statements to the police. Finally, defendant asserts, again for the first time on appeal, that he was denied due process when the judge allowed the State to read into evidence certain portions of the cross-examination of defendant from the first trial. His case ended in a mistrial in November after a Camden County jury deadlocked on all three charges in a case that attracted national news coverage as well as extensive local and regional coverage.

A December lie detector test indicated he lied when he denied hiring neulandeg to kill his wife. He explained that, although he subsequently learned that his name had come up in another homicide investigation and that he voluntarily talked to the police regarding that investigation, he had no concerns that he would be charged with that homicide.

The Honorable Linda G. During his sentencing, Daniels blamed his actions the night of the murder on a drug problem, which his lawyer, Craig Mitnick, said his client had suffered since age After Carol finished her telephone conversation, Jenoff followed her into the living room. Phillips was aware of Jenoff, and she knew he was a shady character, caase that he was good friends with the rabbi. And by then Fred was a compulsive philanderer. Area fged reported rumours that the panel hung in favor of guilt.

He had not tried to comfort his wife of nearly 29 years. He had not said the Vidouee prayer, the Jewish last rites, over her. Despite the fact that blood was all over his living room, not a drop was on his clothes. He showed absolutely no emotion. Twenty years later, more than families belonged. It was the largest Jewish temple in South Jersey. Charming and charismatic, Neulander won people over by the force of his personality.

He was known for lavishing special attention on attractive women during Friday services at the temple.